Intentional image and transcendental image in the work of art: An ontological analysis

Bogdan Nita

Academy of Fine Arts, Vienna, Austria

The purpose of this paper is to show that images have an ontological support by which they obtain an independent existence from the mind. In accordance with the new theories of aesthetics, we will see that the object of art is taken as an object of thought. Image has an important role in the existence of the work of art in that the image becomes an object of thought. To show how the image is independent from the mind or to show how it is not a mind-dependent object, the analysis has to start from the pre-ontological level of the work of art in order to understand the existence of images in correlation with the work of art. At the beginning there is only the object. The object is the work of art before its concretization. It is not nature, it is the natural support of art. From this point of view, the role of the image can be explored in all ontological stages of the work of art. Firstly, it can be argued that the intuition of the artist is the image of the idea underlying the work of art. The intentional image is a subjective image. Secondly, it seems that people can see or have in mind different images (representations) referring to a work of art. This is possible in time and space and implies cultural differences, historical events and so on. A question arises: what supports the intentional image? One answer put forward is that the mind is the support of the image, but it seems that the original intentional image has something that can make other intentional images possible, an infinite number of representations, in other words an infinite number of images. The aim of this paper is to show that we can talk about an original intentional image (the first idea), intentional images (the representations of the work of art in time and space), and the transcendental image which can be defined as the ontological condition for the existence of the intentional image. At the end I will argue that the transcendental image is the support or the entity which offers the ontological conditions necessary for all intentional images.

KEYWORDS: Intentional image; transcendental image; ontology; object and subjectivity

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When we see a chair, read a book or contemplate a painting, an image appears in our mind. The objects are nothing more than ideas: the idea of a chair, the idea from a book or a painting etc. Therefore, we can say that we have the image of some ideas. If we agree with this we can consider images as ‘something’ which is, in a certain way, mind-dependent. Husserl’s idealist view states that all things are mind-dependent. Husserl's idealist view states that all things are mind-dependent. In this case, we are dealing only with fictional objects. Thus, we have the image of a fictional object or the images itself are fictional objects. But there are various aspects that make this position doubtful. For example, in Lacan’s view when we are talking about images we...
must start from three main concepts: the imaginary, the symbolic, and the real. These three systems guide our understanding. Without these we cannot understand anything about experience and, as long as the image is mental-dependent, we must pay attention to our psyche and its interactions. This applies to real things and to the relation between our psyche and objects. But when we are talking about images we must understand them independently from mind and objects, we have to grasp the image’s functions and its ontological conditions to understand it as a pure entity.

To show the differences and the approaches between the intentional and transcendental images, I will take as an example Bosch’s *The Garden of Early Delights*. The painting is representative for the *corps morcelé* (fragmented body) in two ways: the format of the painting is triptych (the unity of the image is fragmented), and it represents a disintegrated ego. First of all, the triptych form imposes a way of reading the painting under mythical symbols: the left and the right panels are portraying the ‘Eden’ and the ‘Last Judgments’ respectively, whereas the center panel reflects the main idea, the eroticism. In this situation the idea of fragmentation can be regarded in two ways: first, it represents the spiritual life in three stages (the beginning, the living, and the end), second, it is a life image supported by various (*motif*) images. The motif image is the intentional image and originates in the artist’s original idea on which the painting was created. Each image becomes visible through color and form: the color provides the narrative temporality, whereas the form is bound to symbols. Secondly, the disintegrated ego emerges from the from the painting’s *aphanisis*: the symbols are the motives of the image which herald a movement from insufficiency to anticipation that takes place in the imagination. The intentional image becomes possible through the imaginary, and the subject bounds it with something that the subject already holds. More clearly, the motif images exist on a transcendental support that coexists within the subject. In this case, the transcendental image is the condition of the intentional image to take place, and on which it can be materialized. In other words, the painting’s motif images bear their symbols into the subjects only if they are triggered by a transcendental support. In this situation the subject is affected by the portrayed life of the ‘Garden’.

Besides the role of the images from the *Garden* we must emphasize that the painting abounds in symbolic motifs. The color can reflect a time before the creation of the light, the metamorphosis of the animals and human beings offers a surreal life to accentuate the vices, the presence of some biblical figures reveals the painting’s traditional culture and the combination between the fantastic and from day-to-day life elements accentuates the symbols of the seven deadly sins. However, an analysis of all its motifs would be irrelevant for the ontology of the image; however they support the power of the image in relation with the subject that contemplates the painting. Therefore, some correlation with the symbolicity of the painting will be made. Having said that, the image can be analyzed starting from the following situation: the relation between a work of art and the subject in space and time. This gives us three possible images:

a) the original intentional image – the idea of the artist;
b) the intentional image(s): the representation in time and space of the work of art;
c) the transcendental image: the ontological support of the intentional image.

In this context, the major role goes to the transcendental image which can be understood as the entity that can be grasped through our capacity of receiving representations (impressions), and through these representations we have the possibility to know this concept and its functions. As Kant said, through our representation the object is given to us, and through cognition the object can be thought in correlation with our representations.

The present paper will try to shed light on the matter by applying an ontological analysis to individual things, in this instance to images. The purpose is not to develop an ontological analysis of the concept of image, nor to describe the structure of our thought about image, but to grasp how the image is in itself.

### 1. The image as an element of thought

Some believe that modern aesthetics is drifting away from its constitutive issues and from the rules of art and it is becoming a way of thinking that generates a new vision, where the elements that

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1 In *Seminar XI*, Lacan refers to Montaigne as the one who centered himself on the *aphanisis* of the subject. The *Garden*, in this sense, reflects an absence of the virtues by the presence of the sexual desires. The symbols of the paintings are signifiers depicting the emptiness of the subject.

2 Lacan, p. 78.

3 For a better understanding let’s take this example: we can have the imaginary symbol of a table whenever someone says the word “table” if and only if we are familiar with the traditional background of his culture. The form of the table varies from culture to culture but its function remains the same in the given cultural tradition.

4 This is a method used by Ingarden and Armstrong under the name of ‘revisionary metaphysics’.
form or constitute the arts are elements belonging to thought, not to art. Looking back on the history of aesthetics, it becomes obvious that we are dealing with an evolution of thought about art and an evolution of thought in which the objects of art become objects of thought. The modern view on aesthetics is in fact an amplified return to Baumgarten’s definition, where aesthetics does not study art but the sensitive area of knowledge. Kant would follow the same path in a way, by referring to aesthetics as the theory of the sensitive forms. Finally, aesthetics is not a field belonging to art or the analysis of art, but a way of judging the elements of art as elements of thought.

It is hard, now, to understand the role of the ontology analysis in the sphere of the aesthetics. But, since the aesthetic elements are regarded as elements of thought, the ontology will appeal to other sciences in order to explain the mod of being of the image. This is way we will refer to Lacan’s psychoanalysis. The images of the Garden offer, besides their simple iconic nature, disparate feelings that have a formative role for the subject’s ego. In other words, the fragmented images of the Garden are manifesting themselves in the consciousness of the subject affecting its identity. If the images of the Garden are aesthetic elements, then, the same images are fracturing the identity of the subject. The aesthetic elements are revealing themselves only though contemplation – aesthetic experience – that takes place in the subject’s consciousness. Hence, the existence of the image lies in a determinative relation between the object of art and the subject. One without other would lead to an ontological paradox of the existence of images.

Because the image is an element of the work of art, the image is an aesthetic element of thought. Hence, the role of the image is completely different from that presented in traditional theories. The image present three ontological stages in a work of art: firstly, there is the intentional image of the original idea of the artist, secondly, there is the intentional image expressed or represented by the work of art, and finally there is something that correlates the two stages of the intentional image, namely the transcendental image. We can also say that the transcendental image enhances the image itself. For instance, a painter has an idea to paint something to express X, in reality the picture which has inherited the idea to express X does not express X because of the several factors such as time, space and the contemplator himself. A contemplator could feel the X sentiment but in different ways. We cannot be sure that the first intentional idea to express X is the same as the sentiments felt by a contemplator. But the representation or the aesthetic feeling originates in the initial idea expressed by the artist. If we are consider two people from different centuries contemplating the same picture, they will have, in their minds, two different intentional images of the same picture based on the initial intentional image. This means that a work of art has one original intentional image and, at the same time, presents the possibility of an infinite number of intentional images. Though, the intentional image of the original idea can be understood through an interpretation of the period in which the painting Garden of Early Delights was created. The knowledge of the painting’s historicity means a better interpretation of the representational images: the hermeneutics helps us to accentuate the symbols that come alongside with the painting’s images. All the images can be depicted through the symbols that they bear.

If the images are elements of thought, and if they require knowledge for their inner symbols, then the images are social objective entities. We expect that everyone holds the same culture in order to depict (correctly) the image’s symbols, and we identify ourselves with it as an external form of our identity. This reminds us of Lacan’s mirror stage: the subject suffers a transformation whenever he accepts an image that holds in itself the possibility of an imago effect. In this metaphorical process the intentional image must be bound with a transcendental support, hold by the subject, but in a universal way, in order to produce the effect of imago. Since the image needs an external impulse for its effect, then it should have different ontological levels that depend on the context in which the subject and the image stand. At this level the image should be an element of thought inasmuch as an aesthetic element. But how does the transcendental dimension of the image should be understood?

Images can withstand the passage of time and be equally powerful irrespective of space and independently from the cultural or social environment. This is possible because a work of art includes two types of images:

a) The intentional image - the concretization of the idea of the work of art.

b) The transcendental imagine - the image itself has the power to provide multiple interpretations and form countless meanings.

In time, the intentional image becomes a transcendental image. How is this possible? Both images imply an imaginary process that can be understood as follows: an artist who paints an idea

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paints the image of that idea; during the process of contemplation, this image has the power to show an infinite number of mental images. A mental image exists because of its intentional determination, and thus we are dealing with an intentional image different from the original intentional image. Both must have the same entity to exist independently from the contemplator and similarly during the contemplation. One who is not aware of the seven deadly sins from the contemplator and similarly during the contemplation, this image has the power to show an original idea (and this imply an awareness of the addressed topics), or can reveal a new image – a mental one – that can be totally in contradiction with the intentional image of the original idea, yet offering an intentional subjective image.

6 The Garden of Early Delights has a biblical theme on its basis which is revealed in three phases: Eden, Fantasy World, and Last Judgment. Due to the transcendental image the three panels can be depicted in confirmation with the intentional image of the original idea (and this imply an awareness of the addressed topics), or can reveal a new image – a mental one – that can be totally in contradiction with the intentional image of the original idea, yet offering an intentional subjective image.

2. The pre-ontological level of the work of art: the object

In order to understand the transcendental image and its role, it is necessary to return to the pre-ontological level of the work of art. To understand the pre-ontological level we can start by trying to answer several questions, such as: what exists before a work of art? What does it consist of? We can answer by saying that before it there was the idea, the paper that comes from the tree, the imagination and so on. If we are wondering what exists before a visual work of art, the answer could be the canvas with its transformation (in painting), objective nature (in cinema or photography) or imagination (in 3D art). All these questions can be summed up into the following question: is there something that precedes the work of art? Yes, the pre-ontological status of the work of art. The pre-ontological level allows us to understand the transcendental image and to see how it is related with an intentional image and in which conditions we can talk about a pattern image as an element of the work of art.

Work of art as intentional nature

In the archaic era, tehnē stood for both art and craftsmanship and at the same time nature was governed by tehnē. The first antique artistic forms were guided by three theories: cosmology or the theory on the structure of the universe, later psychology and then intentional human activity. Each led to the emergence of various types of arts, myths or concepts depending on the understanding of the role of art and the process of its concretization. Every art had its purpose, corresponding to each theory. The arts were spiritual activities with the purpose of creating a relation between God and humanity, an intimate expression of the human spirit that was meant to improve life. Reason had to enlighten every artistic object or act otherwise we could not know its purpose. If an art object did not have a purpose, it was useless, and this is the reason why Plato was hostile to the arts and to artists in Ion, Phaedrus or in the Republic. When he banished poetry he was doing so for a higher good. The images existed only if the art was related with, for example, worshipping the gods but in a moral way. Poetry had to be cultural, etc. Consequently, the issue of image and the understanding of its meanings becomes a problem that implies the space and time of their comprehension: it must have a transcendental characteristic. In this case, the images become elements of reflection, hence of thought.
created on rational principles and Plato said that this was not possible because of its power of interpretation. Hence, the image is presented for the first time as independent form the work of art and rational principles and it allows for interpretation. However, the image gains its role through Aristotle’s mimesis which implies the concept of imitation and the concept of representation. But still, mimeses is not only an aesthetic phenomenon; it is a basic element of human nature. The role of the arts is still rational: imitative arts are rooted in human nature and the pleasure they give has a ‘cognitive value’. For Aristotle, artists were ‘image makers’ but the image had to be probable or necessary. These ideas show us that from the beginning, the works of art were intentional in nature.

The work of art must arise from something, from an object. Tehné is the procedure used to transform the object into art. Afterwards, the idea and the image as a representation of the work of art are ontological entities of the entire process of the concretization. If the work of art is limited to the idea and has not yet an image, it is just an empty idea. But at the same time the subject transforms the idea into an infinite number of interpretations and visions leading to the first understanding of the image: an intentional activity of the subject.

We can say that the fundament of the work of art is the object understood as its matter. We can interpret tehné as the action which transforms the object or a part of an object into art. But tehné is not only the transformation of the object, it is also art itself. In ancient philosophy using tehné as art was considered wrong because the word tehné meant craft which was the practical application of an art. In this way, another meaning of tehné becomes apparent: the art of craftsmanship.

The rules of art encourage us to solve the problem of the pre-existence of the work of art. The oldest thought of how art is the idea of mimesis. But this idea is strictly related to the idea of tehné having a double meaning. Starting from the Platonic statement, art is imitation, and life itself is imitation, thus imitation is not specific to art but to the existence of man. Therefore, mimesis belongs to the biological nature of man. In the beginning, a child learns by imitating the gestures, words and habits of adults. We imitate not only to produce a work of art, but to live according to certain established rules. A problem arises: what can we imitate in order to create a work of art? Nature would involve several existential connections and this is why we must look for something specific in the level that pre-exists art. From this point of view, the arts are strictly related to life, they are a part of nature and they are real. Holistically speaking, we can say that arts are intentional nature and the images are an effect of the intentionality.

**The object as the pre-ontological entity of the work of art**

In order to explain the pre-ontological stage of the work of art we must start by analyzing the incongruent connection between the object and the work of art: the work of art is an intentional product while the object is its support. The modern term ‘creation’ is the process of concretization of the object into a work of art. Creation (which is similar in meaning to tehné) can be understood as the process of domesticating the object, i.e., transforming the object into a work of art. In this process we can find the role of the intentional images and the entity upon which they are based.

According to Grenier, the object is analyzed in conformity with the functions of finality of the domestication process. The idea of a purpose is still a condition of a work of art. He speaks about the ‘distant object’ which implies several categories of the object after the contemplation process. Then about the ‘ritual object’ which is religious, mystical and magical. Its characteristic is the rite as an active form that strengthens the object in a cyclical manner. The work of art is destined to be transformed and thus elevated from the initial level of profane nature to the level of sacred nature, to then return to the first state as a work of art. In this case we can talk about the image in an ontophanic way. In addition, there is the ‘usual object’ which, because of its properties, opposes the ‘distant object’. The role of the image relative to the ‘usual object’ is a double one as the ‘usual object’ features on the one hand utility as a social form and on the other hand, it offers the appearance of a work of art that leads the image towards luxury, in other words, to a new type of object - the ‘decorative object’. Therefore, the work of art is a result of the Object that presents itself in various ways combining utility with beauty. The image could be understood in the

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I use the word tehné in two ways: firstly, the initial meaning - craftsmanship – which is the rational method through which works of art are produced, and the second meaning is used in the context of episteme, i.e. having the knowledge to do something.

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8 The expression des domestique is used by Jean Grenier in L’art et ses Problèmes. Its meaning refers to breaking away a part of an unknown object and transferring it to the intelligible and visual field.

9 What is interesting in the process of art is the role and transformation of the image. If initially the image of the ritual object has mystical and sometimes magical features, depending on the social context, the image is limited to understanding the meanings of religion or rites. The decline of the object to the profane level transforms the image by giving it universal symbols. At the first stage, the image is intimately linked to social conscience, and it becomes universal through the work of art.
pre-ontological level as an internal desire and because of our imagination, the concretization of the Object must be proximal with our spiritual needs. Therefore, the image is the warranty that the works of art continue Aristotle’s idea, that it has a purpose. If a work of art cannot provide an image we are dealing with a paradox.

The work of art is transformed from the object and becomes artificial while images present a game of the social and of the work's themes. The work of art is, therefore, an object that has artistic and aesthetic properties, while the image becomes a playful transcendental entity between these two features of the object. Though, the last type of object Grenier refers to is the ‘technical object’ which does not belong to the natural world but to the human world. The ‘technical object’ is the intermediary stage between the Object and the work of art and it is exclusively a part of the social environment. It is important to note that the object is imposed whereas the work of art is produced. The work of art is usually associated with exceptional things like a book or a painting. A simple definition of work of art could be: a product with and in experience, but the product as a thing in itself is very hard to understand. In this sense, Dewey said “when we feel a spiritual lack. The image is the image of the idea, the original intentional image of the work of art and the intentional images. All this three types of images are rooted in the same thing: an ontological entity (something) that makes the image itself possible as an image. This entity must be the transcendental image.

To understand the necessity of the existence of the transcendental image we need to know if the intentional image is self-sufficient. When we have a thing in front of us or in our mind, we have to know the proprieties that make it what we see. All the proprieties of a thing are dependent upon each other. The dependency itself shows us that we are dealing with a non-self-sufficient image. Therefore, an intentional image could not exist independently: it requires other entities for the unity of its whole such as a painting, picture and so on. Yet, the intentional image requires also something deeper, an entity which is non-temporal and non-spatial, and this entity could be the transcendental image.

How can we understand the transcendental image in a work of art? First of all, the work of art is an autonomous entity and the image itself is an element of this autonomy. The image is a phenomenon: to understand the image we have to know how a thing becomes an image. However, the fundamental ontology is not concerned with understanding something, but with the problem of being-in-the world. To understand the image we do not have to find out the present sense but the projection into the future. The image is something prior to cognition, a power, a being. A self-sufficient image needs to unfold the possibility of being indicated by the work of art. In this sense, Heidegger said that if we interpreted a text, this does not “entail imposing a ‘signification’ on a text...
or placing a value on it, but clarifying the involvement that is disclosed by the text in our always prior understanding of the world. But what gives us the impression that the image exists and is correlated with the being? If the work of art exists only in experience, this means that the image is correlated priori to my experience. If the intentionality is not active there is no image, but if we have an intentional attitude we may comprehended an image. The image as an idea that exists a priori to all works of art as a form of our spiritual need, as we already saw.

What gives us the impression that images are real and not fictional? If we read a book we can be sure that the book exists because it is something that we physically hold, but the image is something that we feel, we experience. The image must be true since we have some different sentiments in the process of reading. When we see a painting, photography or a film, our experience is different from the first process of reading. We do not have to be active to get the image. We just watch the static images (painting or photography) or the kinetic images (film). We have two different experiences with different artistic objects. But in both cases the image is in our mind. In our mind we have the significiation of the image from the book, painting or a film and not the image itself. The significiation of the image could be understood differently and this means that the concretizations of the image require something form the subject or are related with the subject. Before we can go any further, we need to establish if the images are outside or inside the subject’s mind.

According to Descartes we have to doubt if we want to know what really exists. In the Third Meditations he says: “but only by a sort of blind impulse that I believed that things existed outside of, and different of me, which, by the organs of my senses, or by some other method whatever it might be, conveyed these ideas or images to me [and imprinted on me their similitudes].” He goes on to say: “but when we consider them as images, one representing one thing and the other another, it is clear that they are very different one from another.” Descartes tries to differentiate between things by means of experience. When one reads poetry one starts to feel something, some sentiments that are determined by the poetry through the process of reading. The image that appears in one’s mind is engendered by the significiation of the words and one’s sentiments (hate, love, enthusiasm, etc.). If we read poetry by Celan, we can create a mental image with the words from the organic poetry, our feelings and from our impressions from what we know, for example, about the Holocaust. The image that is in our mind is now completed through this entire process: reading, feelings and something that we know. The image could not be a pure image but an intentional image. The intentional image could not be ideas because ideas are taken like certain modes of thought and images are constructed but an idea could be an image in a platonic sense. Descartes continues “there is no doubt that those which represent to me substances are something more, and contain so to speak more objective reality within them [...]” In this case there are two different types of reality. Firstly, there is the “formal” reality where all the things from the real world are intrinsically real and the “objective” reality of the things where something (image) exists by its representational content. For example, when looking at Hieronymus Bosch’s painting The Garden of Earthly Delights, we can see that it contains three different realities but represented under a unity which is the imaginational life according to the Bible. The painting is objective reality because its main topic is a representational idea of a true belief which is implied in the Bible. But its complexity of symbols, especially in the central panel, gives the painting a certain degree of ambiguity: the reality, if that is what the images represent, is it in accordance with our intrinsic reality or is it just a fantastic world with moral implications? If the painting, the central panel, is a warning about how our lives may be if we were to give in to temptations, the image expresses the conditions of the possibility. Thus, the images are the proprieties of the objective reality. Considering the images of the painting and their power to generate interpretations, it can be said that the painting is a warning about our human condition. On the other hand, this could be interpreted as a panorama of the lost paradise. If the image of the painting is conditioned by our mental process, the painting could satisfy our own imagination, and this perspective makes things complicated.

First, we have the image (images) of the painting, they are the intentional image of the painter (Bosch), they are intrinsic reality, but when the painting is contemplated the intentional images undergo a process of transformation started by the subject. It is in the image’s power to represent what the subject involuntary has in his mind. The painting is just a form of being that makes the transformation process of the images possible. The

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14 Ibid., p. 64.
15 Ibid. (in the French version: i.e., participate by representation in a higher degree of being or perfection).
original intentional image is the condition for the new image which is achieved by the subject, through his mental power, and what unites them is the transcendental image. This means that the original intentional image has the power to fulfill or to start the imagination. The image seems to be the objective element that could accomplish the imagination of the simple being. In this sense, the image has numerous interpretations and all can be possible because they represent an intrinsic reality. In this structure, the colors, the biblical characters, the Eden, the Last Judgment and other artistic elements help to construct the transcendental image. For now, the transcendental image can be defined as the image which exists before any interpretation of the painting and that stems from the relation between the subject and the work of art. This could not be an empirical image because the image does not arise from experience: it is discovered in time and space.

The transcendental image is not the image that we have in mind when we see a painting or we read a book, it is the condition for imagination and thus for image. It is the main entity of the image, which has the power to generate different meanings for each person according to sociological, geographical and cultural principles.

How can this be possible? Or, is it possible? We have to find the source of the infinite number of meanings of the image in general. When an artistic object is made, it is created according to an idea. But, when the object is transformed into an artistic object, it holds the image of the first idea. The question is: why do we see more or something else? Why do we transform the intentional image given to us by a painting, a sculpture, poetry or a movie into a new image which is achieved by the subject, through his mental power, and what unites them is the transcendental image. For now, the transcendental image can be defined as the image which exists before any interpretation of the painting and that stems from the relation between the subject and the work of art. This could not be an empirical image because the image does not arise from experience: it is discovered in time and space.

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Our past experiences are preserved in our minds as memories. The image exists in an intimate relation with memory. According to Bergson the memory has two ways of being. The first, the habitual memory (motor mechanism), is stored in the brain and is evident in behavior, and the second, pure recollection (independent recollections) is stored within consciousness. However, according to Gross, there is another type of memory (voluntary memory) which has the power to summon images from the past in order to apply them to an immediate situation. This type of memory is known to be in opposition with the involuntary memory, also known as 'proustian memory': we can interpret the first two types of memory as parts of the voluntary memory. From this point of view, images are connected to memories. But, how are images connected to memories or what kind of relationship is there between images and memories? Going back to the earlier example about the Garden, we could say that images, intentional or real, refer to an unsecured (non-self-sufficient) existence. For instance, when we see an image in reality that is not an image but a hallucination, it does not mean that the image does not exist, but the real element is the one that does not exist. Therefore the conditions necessary for the intentional image are born from our memories. Take for example the classical desert hallucination, when people see rivers because they are thirsty. The existence of the image is unsecured in relation with reality but has a subjective ontological explanation depending on our memories. But is there a support where we store our memories? In both cases, with the painting and with hallucinations, we could say that there is a continuation of the intentional or natural image in our consciousness. We could not see, as a hallucination, a river in the middle of the desert if we did not have some conditions to experience this hallucination. We know that if we are thirsty we have to drink water, and we know many different images of water. So, from the storehouse of impressions we could create an image in the middle of the desert. The river could of course be improved through our imagination: we could see the hallucination as we want to. This means that in our memories there is some kind of background for the existence of an image. In the case of the painting, the intentional image exists strictly related to the idea of the painter. But nowadays a viewer could interpret the painting according to his memories. This means that the intentional image of the painter is transformed into another intentional image if the necessary conditions are met. The condition is the background of the image, the transcendental image of the first intentional image. The transcendental image is the image that keeps the ontological elements of the image. Without this, there could not be an image because we would not have a support for an intentional image. And the transcendental image is neither dependent on the intentional image or a natural image, nor on the subject. It is an ontological condition for the existence of the image in time and space.

Conclusion

The subject is always captivated by the power of image. In front of the image the individual is exposed entirely becoming a part of the structural effects of the intentional image. In this situation the subject encounters a permanent movement from the images. Since the image moves the ego of the subject, directing it to an imaginary order, the
Garden is the expression of subject’s real rupture. Nevertheless, the subject exists always in the realm of the imaginary. This shows us the complexity of the construction that the image has. Since the subject takes part on the manifestation of the intentional image then it holds something that puts in action the images. Through the subject the image becomes complete and its expression has a purpose. Hence, the transcendental entity of the image comes through an action without depriving it from its universality. The fact that the subject suffers an inner transformation is proving that the image itself has an external need for it concretization.

Conversely, the ontological method applied to the analysis of the image requires two conditions to support the existence of the transcendental image. Firstly, we have to be certain that the image is a sensitive representation which is different from the representation of reality. Secondly, the image has a potency which is not expressed empirically. These are the reasons why the image sometimes, if not always, cannot be rationalized. An image does not hold a guarantee for the truth, the image is not true or false, the image can be both at the same time: it is an infinite source of meanings.

The transcendental image can be applied to different circumstances and can support all types of images. This variation is based on an interaction between the subject and the image itself. Every experiment, with the painting or the hallucination, can be interrelated with the external conditions, those conditions that are outside of the subject.

Finally, the psychoanalysis and the ontology of the image explore the way in which the image exists, but, only in the liberty of the imaginary. The psychoanalysis shows that an individual is the subject of a modified ego, whereas the ontology shows that the image suffers different ontic modifications in its rapport with the contemplator. Both sciences reveal the character of the transcendental image within the relation between the subject and the work of art.

References